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Abstract
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Wolfgang Holdheim, writing on the same subject, observes that the legal error at the end of that novel is
indicative of the ambiguities inherent in modern literature's approach to reality. These critics have shown
a sensitivity to a topic otherwise rarely treated: the use of the legal theme within the modern novel not
merely for dramatic effect, but also for thematic, structural and formal purposes not explicitly stated by
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THE CODIFICATION
OF WESTERN LAW
& THE POETHICS
OF DISCLOSURE 1
Richard Weisberg
peaking perceptively of the criminal procedure in The Brothers
Karamazov, Edward Wasiolek points out that the "legal process is an
obstacle to the facts ... [It] brings forth only technique, ambition and
triviality."2 Wolfgang Holdheim, writing on the same subject, observes that
the legal error at the end of that novel is indicativ~ of the ambiguities inherent in modem literature '8 approach to reality.3 These critics have shown a
sensitivity to a topic otheIWise rarely treated: the use ofthe legal theme within the modern novel not merely for dramatic effect, but also for thematic,
structural and formal purposes not explicitly stated by the writer.
Why is the novel a particularly happy generic medium for the intense
development of a legal theme? The answer launches us into a more complicated theoretical realm than we might intuitively expect, but it is one worth
entering in an effort to understand the full import of the theme as actually
used by these novelists. It involves a three-part response encompassing dramatic, historical and formal elements within the genre.
The "dramatic" aspect indigenous to the artistic use of the law stands out,
of course, as a conunon feature in a variety of literary periods and genres. 4
Epitomized in the "trial scene," the legal theme is employed in tragedy, for
example, as an almost perfect Aristotelian device for furthering the dramatic "actioo,"S and for prqducing the reversals and discoveries that lead to
catharsis within the audience. In comedy, the trial provides an excellent
medium for ''untying the Gordian Knot," and restoring the characters and
their environment to a properly happy, anterior condition. 6
But these observations about the efficacy of trial scenes for dramatic
effect on the stage leave open at least two questions. First, how may we distinguish the law's dramatic appeal to literary artists from that of other human
professional endeavours that are equally as provocative in reality but far less
frequently depicted in art? Second, how do we proceed to explain the interest of narrative as opposed to theatrical art in the law?
If we observe that the law provides by the very structure of its operation
a culminating point inscribing all the elements of theatricality otherwise
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associated only with artistic productivity, we are helping to answer our first
question. For that single element most surely linking the two fields in a
unique way is the mutual dependence on language itself
Indeed, there inheres both in literature and the law, as a necessary intermediary toward the ultimate dramatic articulation of their essential components, the task of reconstructing a given and otherwise formless reality into
a governable narrative structure. The literary artist implicitly recognizes that
the law's most dramatic moments duplicate and metaphorize the literary
experience of employing language to bring fonn to a given experience hitherto inarticulate and unstructured.
But a distinction must still be drawn between the dramatic (or scenic)
evocation of the legal theme (usually epitomized in a Htrial scene") and the
narrative interest in the law, which mayor may not culminate in a trial
scenes. Why would the epic or the novel treat the law with even greater frequency than was the case with tragedy or comedy? It does seem reasonably
self-evident that the immediacy of the visual moment is lacking in novelistic
trial scene, which are always mediated by some form of narrative voice. This
may be why the legal element in epics and novels is sometimes overlooked,
or, when recognized, criticized as dull and repetitive. 7
Yet the 13th century Icelandic epics and the 19th and 20th century novel
demonstrate the artistic attraction to the law within narrative genres. Here we
must extend our inquiry beyond the dramatic and into historical and formal
elements unique to certain generic periods. In the present context, and in
light of parallel research by others on the Icelandic epic,S we confine our discussion to the modern novel.
The confluence of several important developments within 19th century
law may partially help to explain that same historical period's literary fascination for the legal theme. Perhaps primary among these was the tendency
across the continent ofEurope toward codification ofall major bodies oflaw.
Napoleonic France was in the vanguard of this movement, and the French
Codes of the first decade of the 19th century became a model for the rest of
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Europe. 9 In the Alexandrine Russia ofDostoevski's day the laws were being
refonned and codified, and the Codes of 1864 became a subject of conversation among literary artists and novelistic characters too. IO Germany, a late
starter (but a fast finisher) in the quest for national self-definition, codified
its laws on the Napoleonic model at the tum of the century. II
These several codifications brought continental law forcefully to the
attention of most educated Europeans of the period. Writers in general, but
especially novelists intending to depict influential factors within their society, often assimilated with particular precision the language and values of the
developing legal institutions. Sometimes, as in the cases of Balzac, Dickens,
Dostoevski, Flaubert, Melville, Zo]a and (later) Solzhenitsyn, criminal procedures and trials came to be autobiographical realities, through these
authors' voluntary or involuntary participation in legal matters. 12
More subtly, the codification of the laws may have attracted writers to the
perception of the innate similarities between legal and literary forms of
expression. The emphasis on the continent of Europe upon the codified legal
text as the source ofvarious complex analyses, appealed to hermeneutic problems associated with an increasingly complex and self-conscious literature as
wellY
In England and America, the common-law system moved far more slowly toward codification of any kind. But the institutions of legality nonetheless advanced into areas of complexity appealing to novelistic sensitivities.
As the century produced a highly technical and commercialized society, so
there came to be a rise in the importance of the courts to settle disputes
resolvable in no other forum.
In every major western literary culture, courts and their emissaries,
lawyers, were coming to be perceived as powerful and even threatening presences. But because literary artists particularly recognized themselves within
certain aspects of 19th century law and procedure, their use of legality as a
novelistic theme went far beyond externally-imposed criticism and into a
realm of self-conscious association. Like their spiritual ancestor, Hamlet, literary writers lashed, out at the spectre of lawyers not so much to take an
opposing profession t<l task as to articulate better their own deepest uncertainties.
For within the novel itself, historical factors were at work. Alive and creating in a period of shifting and even disappearing values, writers perceived
the law as the only remaining voice of institutional and social authority. But
as artists gradually recognized, 19th century law was far more a procedural
system than a body of dictates as to substantive human behavior. As in their
own genre, so too in the law, formal complexity seemed to become an end in
itself as over and above the exposition of moral, ethical or political values.
Epitomized by Flaubert, this tendency evoked in many legalistic novelists a
troubling and even self-critical recognition.
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Perhaps the best way to articulate what may have been the novelist's basic
observation about the law is to register the inclination during the 19th century away from the mode ofjudgement and toward the mode of wit. 14 This tendency both attracted the writer to, and repelled him or her from, contemporary legality. By this paradoxical response to law, the novelist best managed
to express an analogous ambiguity about his or her own endeavour.
The distinction between wit and judgement, central to the comprehension
of 19th century legality, serves too as a subtle indication that legality and a
form of Nietzschean ressentiment are powerfully linked phenomena in the
modem nove1. 15 John Locke was one of the first modern thinkers, in his
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, to make the distinction: 16
And hence perhaps may be given some reason of that common
observation,-that men who have a great deal of wit, and
prompt memories, have not always the clearest judgement or
deepest reason. For wit lying most in the assemblage 0/ ideas,
and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make
up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy; judgement, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully, one from another; ideas wherein can be found the
least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude,
and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of
proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and allusion; wherein
for the most pan lies that entenainment and pleasantry o/wit,
which strikes so lively on the fancy ...
Locke, then, describes wit as an imaginative process of metaphorizing:
one observed phenomenon is cleverly associated with another. Judgement,
on the contrary, avoids fanciful reconstructions and seeks, instead, careful
distinctions. Resisting personal creativity, the H man of judgement" reasons
soberly, and according to pre-established norms. Hence the judge brings the
general sense ofjustice of his society to bear on each particular case which
comes before him.
Indeed, to the present day, Europeanjudges theoretically look to the written codes as the sole and absolute guide for distinguishing each litigable circumstance. And whereas in the Anglo-American system more dependence is
placed on the particular facts of any case, the advocate's urge to reason
inductively from facts to authoritative precedents his or her findings of similes!7 is supposedly mitigated by the judgmental insistence that those authorities actually apply to the given disputed situation.
Friedrich Schlegel, writing at the beginning of the literary period under
discussion in these pages, grasped the penetrating reliance on innate wisdom
that theoretically differentiates the adjudicator from those (like the poet and
advocate) whose enterprise is defined by wit: 18
~,

For in all such cases the decision invariably depends upon an
immediate feeling a/propriety, which, thoughfirst calledfonh
and developed by the social intercourse of life, is in truth original and innate. Such, indeed, it must ever be. For where it
does not exist naturally, it can never be learned nor artificiallyacquired. The original want o/this inwardjeeling can never
be replaced by any varnish of external culture, however brilliant. And the case is also the same even in the sphere of science; for instance, in the shrewd, searching glance by which
the skillful physician makes his diagnosis of disease; or in the
clear, perspicacious sagacity which enables the judge, in some
highly complicated suit or doubtful criminal trial. to seize the
right point on which truth and justice hinge. For in judicial
cases, with much that admits ofdemonstrative proof, or which,
as matter of fact, is unquestioned, there is still more where
nothing but this psychological penetration, long practices in
such matters, and to which past experience has given confidence in itself, can immediately see through all the sophistical
wiles not only of the pleadings and the skillful advocate, but
also of the litigant parties themselves, or of the crafty criminal.
With the acute observational skills at the heart of their craft, modern storytellers soon perceived that contemporary law was dominated by wit and
not by judgement. It fell short of the intuitive ideal ofjustice that many novelists perhaps over-ingenuously still identified as the law's ultimate purpose.
Only in more "simple" times (such perhaps as Locke's own, for he was able
to say that 'judgements of probability are rooted in our faith in the ultimate
rationality and morality of the universe"19) would a society's general sense of
how to act invariably assist the goodjudge (or the jury) to sift out that aspect
of each case indicative of the "just" solution. But those very writers who
were most interested in the law were also aware of the prevalence in their
own society of reHl!ivism and even ressentiment, instead of any universal

sense ofjustice.
In place of judgement, modem law too frequently substitutes sophistry,
artfulness and wit. The cleverest lawyer - the one who best manipulates pro~
cedural strictures, or who most convincingly re-creates a particular fact pat~
tern in order to append it to prevailing authorities sympathetic to his or her
position - will "win," unimpeded by the quickly disappearing Solomonic
sense of the over-riding wisdom. More stress is placed on the creative
process ofre-formulating reality to suit a subjective end than on making certain that society's articulated position is applied faithfully to each appropri..

ate case.
But does not the novelist, too, display the same tendency in the 19th centu-
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ry? Nietzsche in fact forcefully indicts many storytellers of that period (perhaps especially Flaubert), more concerned with their particular artistic
premises than with faithfully rendering a healthy, already assimilated reality:20
A born psychologist instinctively avoids seeing for the sake of
seeing . ... Such a man never works 'from Nature "-he leaves
it to his instinct, to his camera obscura to sift and to define the
''fact/' "nature/' the "experience." The general idea, the conclusion, the result is the only thing that reaches his consciousness. He knows nothing of that willful process of reasoning
from particular cases. What is the result when a man sets
about the matter differently? When, for instance, after the
manner of Parisian novelists, he goes infor notebook psychology on a large and small scale. Such a man is constantly spying on reality and every evening he bears home a handful of
fresh curios. . .. But look at the result!
Because of the modem novelist's self-conscious participation in the
stance of relativism and wit, storytellers proceed to emphasize in their work
the legal tendency toward artistic falsehood as opposed to substantive truth.
Indeed, if they cast their eyes upon the "wittiest" figures in the legal world,
it is because storytellers see reflected in such characters their own proclivity
to create falsely in a social environment totally void of generalized positive
values and increasingly imbued with ressentiment. In the same way, the novelist may see in the law's procedural complexities a fair barometer of modem literature's own self-conscious fonnal concerns in an historical period
that can no longer locate enduring substantive goals.
The form of the novel, in other words, reflects the central theme of the
law within these works. In attempting to isolate one or two formal elements
unique to the novel as a genre, and then to apply them to the use of legality
within several novels, we incorporate the earlier discussion of drama, history and even ressentiment on the level of novel theory.
Georg Lukacs has submitted that the novel as a genre stems from the
epic, rather than the tragic, because both epic and novel are concerned with
what is, while tragedy deals with what should be. 21 The 19th century realist
novel paints with a broad brush the vast institutions of its day, among these,
as we have seen, the law. But the mimetic portrayal within a novel differs
from that within a tragedy, and the terminology of drama should probably be
avoided when speaking of a novel.
One essential difference between tragedy and novel has been identified
by the Russian formalist critics. A novel does not rush ahead with a given
action, but rather takes its time, obfuscating and retarding the advance of the
story through a variety of formal techniques including the "laying bare"22 of
those very authorial devices. It can be said, with Shklovksi, that the plot of
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narrative art is more "the fashioning of the subject of the story as produced
by the introduction of interrupting digressions"23 than it is any single action
perfonned by the characters within the narration.24
These peculiar characteristics of the novel form are perfectly served by a
variety of novelistic uses of the law. The "trial scene" itself, when narrated
within a novel, sometimes appears to be a needless repetition of events that
the earlier narration has recounted in their original form. For example, many
readers become restless during the ninety-page section of The Brothers
Karamazov called "A Judicial Error", the narration of the trial of Dmitri
Karamazov for the murder of his father. The testimony at the trial seems a
mere duplication of narrative time, the introduction of prosecutor and
defense attorney an irrelevance to the sequential development of the "plot,"
and the lengthy closing arguments of the lawyers (part of which is called "An
Historical Survey," a deliberate invocation of the subject matter of Book One
of the novel, called HThe History of a Family") a digressionary bore only tangentially relevant to the "action" of the novel.
The response of boredom is exacer~ated within the reader who has
recently completed another large legal section ofthe novel, "The Preliminary
Inquiry." Impatience with the detailed depiction of the criminal procedure
(which encompasses almost one-fourth of the text) is indicated by the virtual absence of any detailed analysis of "The Preliminary Inquiry," even by
critics sensitive to the legal theme such as Wasiolek and Holdheim. 2s
Still, there can be no overlooking the fact that Dostoevski made a decision in his greatest masterpiece to portray with significant detail and accuracya complete continental criminal procedure. We may realize on closer reading that what seems at first to be not a single but a double repetition of a story
already revealed by earlier pages of the novel, turns out to be formally and
substantively one of the most vital aspects of the work. With a typically keen
eye for detail,26 Dostoevski demonstrates that the law (embodied in examining magistrate Nikolai Parfenovich Nelyudov, and deputy prosecutor Ippolit
Kirillovich) gradually and subtly reduces the criminal suspect to a creature
of its own making. Facts are imaginatively distilled and transfonned through
the process of preliminary investigation and then trial until the original reality is thoroughly obscured.
The lawyers "create" Dmitri, they create the motives for the crime, they
create the "history of a family" and ultimately they create a full-fledged
nihilistic theory of social valuesY The lawyers, in short, duplicate the tech·
niques of the writer himself, laying bare his narrative enterprise. Indeed, the
criminal procedure almost precisely parallels the literary procedure within
the novel. Both move from an exposition of the facts of the crime (the
"Preliminary Inquiry" being the equivalent of the novel '8 early rendition of
the events surrounding the crime), to the narrative articulation of a theory of
reality predicated on those facts (the trial, which even includes are-statement
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by the lawyer of the Karamazov family situation, providing a duplication of
the novelist's own "philosophy" of reality). In this way, the erroneous outcome of the trial attains an immense self-critical significance. If the legal
process ends in falsehood by finding Dmitri guilty of the murder, so the novelistic attempt to recreate a given reality into a verbal fonn may also result in
distortion and negativity.
Yet the cosmic implications of the legal theme within The Brothers
Karamazov, and other similarly structured novels, cannot be faithfully perceived unless readers deliberately brake their temporal voyage through the
novel's pages. They must, in view of subtly conflicting testimony,28 delve
backwards into earlier sections of the text in order to test the accuracy of the
developing legal theory against the suspect. Without taking this unusual step,
which differs from are-reading ofthe text after completing it once in full, the
reader will fail to see the care with which Dostoevski has treated the' smallest details ofthe legal procedure. I have analysed this phenomenon as regards
several seminal "legal novels," for no less insistent analysis of the legal element will do justice to its surprising theoretical ramifications.
The novelist, after all, has presented us with a text almost supersaturated
with details. Unlike the dramatist, he appears less concerned with the ongoing development of an action than with the exposition of data that seems to
retard that development. But within the retardation lies the significance.
For it is fair to say that the negative implications of thematic legality in
literature are furthered by the form of the novel itself. All that is absolute,
including the individual ~s quest for meaningful perception, has broken down
in the late 19th century, even the expectations of a reader entering the aesthetic experience of the work of art. Like the jury after the case is closed,
readers will fall into error as to the notion of reality presented by the writer
unless they make a conscious effort to alter their traditional behaviour vis-avis a temporal art form. They must force themselves to "re-read" parts of a
text before they have even completed the whole.
What Lukacs has said of the short story applies to the longest novel as
well: ~'It sees absurdity in all its undisguised and unadorned nakedness, and
the exorcising power of this view, without fear or hope, gives it the consecration of fonn; meaninglessness as meaninglessness becomes form; it
becomes eternal because it is affirmed, transcended and redeemed by
form."29
Yet, going one step beyond Lukacs, the formal reflection of meaninglessness through the legal thematic ironically serves to disclose the iron-hard
fundamental truth of the self-annihilating novelistic statement. The novelist
first sets forth the crime, as it actually" occurred. 30 He or she then has an
examining magistrate, conducting a preliminary inquiry~ reformulate the '
events of the crime, now somewhat altered. Finally, he or she has the prosecutor at trial create a lengthy narration of the crime, by this time substantially differing both from the "actual" rendition and from the second-level
H
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exposition of the preliminary inquiry.
In other words, as opposed to most other novelistic storytelling, the phenomenon of the criminal procedure allows the author to establish an absolute
(the original narration of the incident) against which the verbally-oriented
characters' rendition of the incident can be tested, in tenns of right and
wrong, justice or injustice. However ambiguous the original narration may
be, it always - in such stories - occupies an unusually privileged place.
Thus the formal harmony of legal procedure and novelistic structure
helps respond to the overwhelming thrust of modern literary criticism, that
fictional constructs exist in a sphere of relativized truths based only on the
intrinsic play of poetic language itself, while it also challenges those other
critics whose idea of truth in the novel anachronistically ignores the utter
breakdown of traditional, social, religious and literary values during the
modern period. Kenneth Burke's excellent argument that, unlike semantic
meanings, '''Poetic meanings ... cannot be disposed of on the true-or-false
basis,"31 fails only in the narrative area in which the novelist purposefully
establishes a spontaneous truth against which all subsequent narrative exegeses within the work offend.
The modem writer finally creates a framework of absolutes - or, perhaps better, "contingent .absolutes" (although the distinction is of minor
importance here) - utterly absent in' the surrounding culture. Novelistic
meaning, like novelistic form, appears to undermine itself and can be discovered only by the most careful perception of a fundamental "truth" (material, not metaphysical) created deliberately by the novelist in order to generate a self-critical dialectic. The rather vague and safely humanist "fillingout" of the poet's meaning, suggested by Burke,32 is contradicted by the concrete association of the storyteller with a legalistic process tangibly embodying truth and falsehood as vitally dynamic notions, the process of the quest
for justice in a court of law.
NOTES:
J I am pleased to publish this piece, which dates to 1976, in this forum.
A paper
offered at the Society for the Humanities of Cornell University and originally entitled "The Literary Lawyer 'Lays Bare' his Novelistic Creator," this slightly revised
text has not been previously published. However, I have amended the footnotes to
foreground some subsequent writings in which I elaborate a few of the paper's
claims. These include The Failure of the Word: The Protagonist as lLIwyer in
Modem Fiction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); and "Law in and As
Literature: Self-Generated Meaning in the 'Procedural Novel"', in Koelb and Noakes
(eds.), The Comparative Perspective on Literature (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1987), pp. 224-32. The titular tenn "Poethics" refers to my Poethics: And Other
Strategies of lAw and Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992),
where the present paper's section on wit and judgement is partly elaborated.
:I Edward Wasiolek, Dostoevski: The Major Fiction (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964),

p. 183.
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W. W. Holdheim, Der Justizirrtum als literarische Problematick (Berlin: de
Gruyter, 1969), pp. 10-42.
4 In addition to the modem novel, fifth century Greek tragedy, Medieval courtly poetry, the Icelandic epic, Shakespearean and Jacobean theatre come to mind as genres
strongly attracted to the presentation of legal dilemmas.
$ In On The Art of Poetry, Aristotle of course identifies the "Fable or Plof' (the
action) as "the end and purpose of the tragedy." (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), p.
37.
6 See Northrop Frye, A Natural Perspective (New York: Columbia, 1963), p. 119ff.
7 Analyses of The Brothers Karamazov, for example, rarely if ever go beyond the
mere mention of "The Preliminary Inquiry," a sixty page section of the novel. See,
for example, Konstantin Mochulski, Dostoevski: His Life and Work. Trans.
Michael A. Minihan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), Chapter XXIII,
for the traditional approach to that section of the novel (ie., one line of analysis).
Compare Belknap, who in the midst of his excellent chapter on the novel's narrative structure, devotes only several sentences to the inquirey, p. 92, 99ff, and who
makes no specific mention throughout his book of any of the lawyers in the novel.
See the only slightly longer analysis of the thematic in Frank Theiss, Dostojewski
(Stuttgart: Seewald, 1971), 215ft'.
8 See a propos of the Icelandic epics, Lee Hollander, The Sagas of Konnak and the
Swomn Brothers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 80. For a recent
study of law in Gennan epic literature, see Ursula R. Mahlendorf and Frank. 1. Tobin,
"Legality and Formality in Niebelunglenlied, Monatshefte 66 (1974): 225-238. Work
is being currently developed on this subject by Professor Alan 1. Berger of Cornell,
to whom I am indebted for his observations about law in the Icelandic sagas.
9 For an excellent compendium of articles, notes and cases dealing with the codification phenomenon in 19th EuropeJ_ see Rudolf B. Schelsinger (ed.), Comparative
Law (Mineola: Foundation Press, 1970), pp. 203-267; and Charles Szladits (ed.),
European Legal Systems (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972)J pp. 131-146.
I 0For the influence of the Napoleonic codification upon the Russian Codes of the
18605 (and, hence, to some extent, upon the early Soviet codes as well), see, for
example, Samuel Kucherov, Courts, Lawyers and Trials Under the Last Three Tsars
(New York: Praeger, 1953), Chapter One; see also, v: Slucevski, Ucebnik Ruskovo
Ugolovnovo Protsessa (S1. Petersburg, n. p., 1895)J pp. 184-91.
II See Schlesinger ed., p. 215.
12 Dostoevski's harrowing personal experience with Tsarist criminal law and procedure early in his life (he thought he was about to be hanged, but the Tsar's officers
were merely "staging" the event prior to sending him into exile) seemed in part to
compel him to follow later developments in the law and even to file pleas in court for
a variety of defendants. See Kucherov, p. 168£.; and Linner, Dostoevskij on Realism
(Stockholm: Almquist, 1967), p.I 137ff.; Aimee Dostoyevski, Fyodor
Dostoyevs/d: (New York: Haskell House, 1972) 52-61, for Dostoevski's use of specific trials as the basis for his depictions of legal characters. For Flaubert's famous
brush with the law, see the fascinating transcript of the trial of Madame Bovary in
Flaubert Oeuvres completes (Paris: Seuil, 1964), II, pp. 724·750.
13
See Gadamer's association of literary and legal henneneutics in Truth and
Method 36ff.; 274-278. See also, Weisberg, extended review of lB. White, The Legal
Imagination (1973), Columbia Law Review 74 (March, 1974): 327-337. Literary
3
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artists attracted to the law frequently raise the issue of interpretation of texts within
their own works. To cite only two: Shakespeare, by virtue of the ~'casket plot" in The
Merchant of Venice, a subtly fitting preliminary to Portia's "tricksy" handling of the
law during the trial scene; and Kafka, who included the puzzling text "Before the
Law" in The Trial.
14 See, Weisberg, Columbia Law Review, 332ff.
IS See my The Failure of the Word (1984) for the elaboration of this thought.
16 John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding I (Oxford: Clarendon,

1894), p.203.
The American lawyer reasons, with wit, from particular facts to general authorities. He strives to see the presence of a similitude between his client's version of the
facts and some pre-existing authority, usually a similar but rarely an identical case.
Thus, he might say to the court, "As in Smith v Smith, wherein the court stated that
a manufacturer could be held liable to the ultimate consumer for inherently defective
goods, so in our case, defendant was negligent and should be held liable to my client."
The court's responsibility, on the other hand, is to assure that the lav.ryer's exercise of
wit does not offend against the inherent meaning of the precedent authorities. It exercises its judgement, its reasoning from the general authorities to the new facts. The
high court of New York (the Court of Appeals) put its court's ftmction this way:
"'... there is neither need nor desirability to work a wholesale abandonment of rule
and principles in order to resolve the issues in this and the cases being decided by the
court at the same time. It is not in,the grand tradition of the common law to do so.
Most important, it is dangerous because abrupt departures in the development of the
common law are not likely to be free of policy error and are disruptive of the law's
stability. Evolutionary development of the law continues to be the lodestar for judicial innovation in the law, burdened as it is by the braking process of stare decisis and
the obligation to preserve predictability. Similar inhibitions, for obvious reasons, do
not apply to the legislative process, where error may be summarily corrected." (Scurti
v City of New York reported in New York 1o.w Journal, 15 July 1976, p.4, column 3).
18 Friedrich Schlegel, The Philosophy ofLife and Language. Trans. Morrison (New
York: n. p., 1848), p. 440.
19 Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, p. cxx.i.
20 Friedrich Nietzsche, Gotzen-Dammerung, Werke, VI, p. 109. Andre Gide quotes
this passage in his influential book, Dostoi'evski (Paris: Ga11imard, 1964), p. 138;
Gide asserts that HDostolevski n'observe jamais pour observer". Hence, Nietzsche's
relative admiration for Dostoeivski (except for the latter's rococo sentimentalism)
French school. Although Dostevski was, very definiteand not for Flaubert and
IYI a "notebook novelist." (Linner, p. 54). His was a deductive (non-witty) method,
from his deeply-felt conceptions to the specific observations ofreality. See Wasiolek,
Introduction to Notebooks of/The Brothers Karamazov" p.18. Nietzsche's stance on
the existence of a 'just outcome" - a surprisingly "unpostmodem" stance - is set forth
at II, ii of The Genealogy oj Morals. See my The Failure of the Word, op. cit.
21 Lukacs, The Theory olthe Novel (Cambridge: MIT, 1971), p. 47.
22 The term "retardation" (the Russian fonnalist use of the word "tonnozenie" also
implies "putting on the brakes") and the term "laying bare" derive from Russian
Formalist theory. Relevant excerpts on these subjects are given in English in L. T.
Lemon and M. 1. Reis (eds.), Russian Formalist Criticism (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska, 1965), pp. 27 and 94.
17
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Shklovski, "Sterne and the Theory of the Novel," cited in part in Lemon and Reis,
ibid., p. 57.
24 In his "Preface" to The Ambassadors, Henry James furthers the traditional AngloAmerican notion that the "story" determines the strength and the worth of any novel.
The Russian formalists would dispute this view, and it is at least arguable that James'
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